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INTRODUCTION

The politics of property is being turned on its head. Nowhere is that
more evident than at the intersection of public power and private rights.
That intersection-defined in part by the Takings Clause'-has a
conventional political valence. Liberals and progressives favor broad
regulatory power.2 Conservatives and libertarians favor strong protection
for private property.' Those predictable positions have become increasingly
unstable, however. In many different regulatory contexts-from zoning, to
eminent domain, to regulatory property-instinctive political reactions no
longer track the underlying substantive stakes of various property conflicts.4
It is especially important to recognize these new trends and pressures
given the contemporary state of politics. With extreme polarization, people
increasingly adopt positions reflexively, responding more to the political
battle lines than to the substance of the issues.' The result is liberals
sometimes fighting against what should be their underlying normative
commitments towards progressive redistribution and conservatives the
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; J.D. 1999,
University of Michigan Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
2. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property's Morale, 110 MICH. L. REv. 437, 443 (2011)
(arguing for expansive view of regulatory power).
3. See, e.g., Joseph Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles,
Investments, and Just Obligations,30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 312 (2006) [hereinafter Singer, Just
Obligations] ("Conservatives tend to view ownership as embodying both expansive rights and strong
protections from government interference. The conservative framework sees property and regulation as
opposites: broad property rights mean less regulation and more regulation means less protection for
property rights.").
4. See discussion infra Part II (describing the "shifting political valence of property and
property protection," which conventional politics does not capture).
5. See, e.g., Libby Jenke & Scott A. Huettel, Issues or Identity? Cognitive Foundationsof
Voter Choice, 20 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 794, 800-01 (2016) (finding that people voting consistently
with identity politics sometimes vote against their own interests).
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opposite.6 At the very least, failing to recognize the evolving stakes of
property disputes means that unnoticed schisms have developed on the left,
in particular.' Identifying those fault lines is the first step to reconciling
them.
This Essay offers a broad gloss on the traditional politics of property
protection and then catalogues a number of ways in which those politics
have been changing. In many cases, the account is of fragmentation and
fracture as once stable commitments have become much more contingent
and fact dependent.' Admittedly, this characterization paints with an
extremely broad brush. That is both its contribution and its weakness. This
short Essay deliberately simplifies the characterization of preferences
across the political spectrum. Much more nuanced definitions would better
track the complexity of the underlying issues. Judges and scholars
discussed below might also object to being lumped together in one group or
another. Furthermore, given these broad definitions, it is always possible to
find counter-examples where the politics lined up differently in the past or
line up differently today. There is nevertheless value in this Essay's roughcut approach. It reveals trends that one might miss when looking with a
narrower gaze. The analysis that follows deliberately sacrifices some
specificity in order to capture higher-level themes and observations.
I. THE TRADITIONAL POLITICS OF PROPERTY PROTECTION

Property and property protection have traditionally had a predictable
political valence. This is not true in the sense of party politics, which are
messy, fickle, and often hard to classify, especially following the recent
presidential election. But it is true of a more abstract set of commitments.
Broadly speaking, conservatives are mistrustful of regulation, favor
protecting the status quo, and resist redistribution. Liberals, in contrast,
have more faith in government, mistrust unregulated markets and private
power, and favor redistribution to protect the interests of the poor and the
relatively powerless.' There are admittedly many other ways to distinguish
6, See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text (describing liberal support for NIMBY
zoning).
7. Joseph William Singer, Kormendy Lecture, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U.
L. Rrv. 601, 626-27 (2015) [hereinafter Singer, Kormendy Lecture].
8. See id (discussing contradictions within conservative and liberal approaches to property
protection).
9.

Compare ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 168, 172 (1974) (arguing

against government redistribution), with JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 326 (1971) (offering
normative justification for redistribution to be more equal and essential for meeting the basic needs of
those less favored). This is not to suggest that conservatives do not care about the poor and the relatively
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between liberal and conservative positions that might generate different and
differently shifting constellations of interests. Some might distinguish
conservatism and liberalism on broader moral grounds."o Liberal and
conservative positions are also not monolithic; both contain divergent
strands that can hide more disagreement than agreement." But this highlevel definition captures a foundational difference that animates liberal and
conservative approaches to different areas of law, as well as their
competing normative commitments.
According to this definition, there is something inherently conservative
about protecting property interests. It reinforces pre-existing distributions of
resources and stands as a bulwark against redistribution. As a result,
conservatives have traditionally opposed regulations that interfere with the
rights of private owners, whether environmental, land-use, or economic
regulations.1 2 On the other hand, liberals believe that property should not
pose a significant barrier to redistributive policies." For example, if the
government seeks to enact rent regulations, the burden on landlords may be
unfortunate, but will not stand in the way of the policy.' 4
This divide is on sharp display in contemporary property theory. In
response to the increasing contextualization of property rights over the
course of the twentieth century, some recent scholars have refocused on the
right to exclude as the fundamental basis of all property." Echoing
Blackstone, and his famous conception of property as a "despotic

powerless, only that they believe strong protection of property rights will ultimately be better at doing
SO.
10. Compare BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 9-14 (1960)
(discussing moral and ideological characteristics of conservatives), with PAUL KRUGMAN, THE
CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 190, 192, 197 (2007) (discussing liberal morals).
11. Traditional conservatives and libertarians, for example, adopt distinctive positions on many
issues, as do traditional liberals and progressives. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr., Beyond Red vs. Blue:
The Political Typology 1, 1-3, 15 (June 26, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-26-14Political-Typology-releasel.pdf (cataloguing political subgroups).
12. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, The Politics of PropertyRights, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 351, 365
(1997) (characterizing the political players in disputes over property rights).
13. See id (discussing how environmental groups support liberal delegation of government
programs such as redistribution); see also, Robert H. Nelson, A Private Property Right Theory of
Zoning, 11 URB. LAW. 713, 716 (1979) ("[Pjrogressive forces believed that the quality of urban
environments could be significantly enhanced by much greater public planning.").
14. Cf David Willetts, Modern Conservatism, 63 POL. Q. 413, 415 (1992) (describing
conservative opposition to rent regulation).
15. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 734-35 (1998) (describing the right to exclude as a core attribute of property). See generally J.E.
PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68-73 (1997) (arguing that property consists of the right of
exclusive use and possession).
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dominion,""6 this approach prioritizes the right to resist others' demands
and is therefore inherently conservative, as this Essay defines the term. In
contrast, an important strand of progressive property theory has articulated
a "social-obligation norm" embedded in the very content of property
rights." In this alternative view, property creates not only rights to exclude,
but also obligations to share resources with others (at least in certain
contexts).1 The conceptual move is to recognize redistribution as inherent
within property and not as an attack on property.
These competing attitudes toward property have also resulted in
familiar and predictable clashes around the constitutional protection of
property under the Takings Clause. Conservatives favor an expansive
reading of the Takings Clause and would require the government to
compensate for most, if not all, regulatory burdens.19 For conservatives, this
is important as a matter of restorative justice-ensuring that property
owners are made whole-and as a constraint on government.20 Liberals, on
the other hand, favor a narrow view of the Takings Clause.21 They reject the
category of regulatory takings altogether, or confine it only to those
regulatory burdens that are tantamount to outright expropriation.22 In this
view, the Takings Clause should not be a meaningful constraint on routine
government regulations.

16. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (identifying property as "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe").
17. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American PropertyLaw,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 757 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Social-Obligation] ("A fully developed
social-obligation norm requires. .. some substantive conception of the common good that serves as the
fundamental context for the exercise of the rights and duties of private ownership."); PROPERTY AND
COMMUNITY 61, 65-66 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peflalver eds., 2010) (discussing property
standards and how they define legitimate interests); Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralismand Property, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1022-23 (2011) [hereinafter Alexander, Pluralism] ("[P]roperty rights should
have their share of social responsibility.").
18. See Alexander, Social-Obligation, supra note 17, at 747, 807 (describing the right to
exclude and the duty to share property with others under certain circumstances).
19. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 314-24 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS] (discussing conservatives' expansive views on
takings).
20. See Echeverria, supra note 12, at 351 (characterizing the conservative perspective on the
Takings Clause).
21. Singer, Just Obligations, supranote 3, at 313.
22. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause and
the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 810, 812, 821 (1995) (advocating a narrow view of
takings liability based upon analogies to physical expropriation).
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This conventional divide traces back to the origins of the regulatorytakings doctrine.23 In Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,24 Justice
Holmes famously articulated the broad outlines of the problem. He
recognized that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." 25 However, he also reasoned that "if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 26 In other words, not every
burden on property violates the Takings Clause, but property nevertheless
imposes some meaningful constraints on government action.
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, argued for a more limited view of property
protection: he reasoned that if coal mining released poison gas, the
government could undoubtedly prohibit the practice without paying
compensation.27 For him, property would not stand in the way of
regulations that protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. As the
scope of these police powers has expanded over time, that position
ineluctably results in narrow-or even nonexistent-protection of property
from valid government regulations.2 8
Conservatives have long responded to the Brandeis view by decrying
property's secondary status in constitutional law.29 They argue that property
is identified specifically in the Constitution, is intrinsically important, and is
necessary for preserving liberty and other rights.3 0 The independence
afforded by private property is important for preserving the right to practice
religion, the right to assemble, and the right to privacy, among others.3 1
However, liberals point to the fact that property, in the Constitution, is

23. See generally Singer, Kormendy Lecture, supra note 7, at 605-06 (mentioning the longstanding conflicts between conservatives and liberals in takings law leading to confusing court
precedent).
24. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922).
25. Id. at 413.
26. Id. at 415.
27. Id. at 417-19 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1248 (2009) [hereinafter Serkin, Existing Uses] ("[Some courts] reason that harm
prevention is a valid exercise of a state's police power and that, since all property is owned subject to
the police power, no such harm prevention can trigger a compensation requirement.").
29.

See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (3d ed. 2008) ("The political and intellectual triumph of the New Deal
seemingly settled this conflict [over the constitutional protection of property] by consigning property to
a secondary status with only minimal constitutional protection . . . ."); see also EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra
note 19, at 15-18 (arguing that property should be treated like other rights).
30. See ELY, JR., supra note 30, at 150-51 (discussing how some justices do not like to draw a
sharp line between personal and property rights).
31. Id. at 150-51, 167.
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protected primarily by a liability rule and not a property rule.3 2 The
government is not prohibited from taking property; it is only prohibited
from taking property without just compensation.33 Private property is not
protected from compensated expropriations.34
These dynamics have combined to create entirely expected attitudes
towards many government regulations. Conservatives have decried
regulations that burden property rights or, at least, have viewed them
skeptically." Against a baseline presumption that property owners are
entitled to do what they want with their property, any regulatory restriction
amounts to a kind of redistribution from the property owner to the
beneficiaries of the regulation. In this view, environmental regulations
amount to a redistribution from property owners to the public, who benefit
from environmental protection. 36 Zoning and land-use controls are exactly
the same.37 For conservatives, both can easily rise to the level of a taking.38
Liberals, in contrast, favor such redistribution and promote the very
regulatory interventions that conservatives dislike." They favor regulations
that will protect the environment or existing communities despite any
incidental impact on property rights.40 All are explicitly or implicitly
redistributive. 4 1 For example, environmental regulations limit property
32. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 884 (2011).
33. Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)
("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just
compensation.").
34. See id. at 194-95 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013, 1018 n.21
(1984)) ("If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort
to that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against the
Government' for a taking.").
35. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its
Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605, 605-06 (1996) (describing conservative reliance
on property to oppose regulations); EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 19, at 263-82 (arguing that almost all
regulatory burdens should be compensable takings).
36. See Richard J. Lazarus, Essay, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 725
(1997) ("[E]nvironmental law is purposefully and necessarily redistributive in a manner antagonistic to
some private property interests."); see also James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the
Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 35-36, 64 (2002) (arguing that many
environmental regulations should be viewed as takings).
37. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 19, at 265 ("Local boards may take private rights of use and
disposition into the public domain without compensation, then parcel them out again to others by
majority rule.").
38. Id. at 265-67.
39. Id. at 266, 315, 322-23.
40. Singer, Kormendy Lecture supra note 7, at 614.
41. See

generally JOEL P.

TRACHTMAN,

TRADE LAW, DOMESTIC

REGULATION AND

DEVELOPMENT 312 (2015) (explaining that liberalized intervention is characterized by implicit
redistribution of regulations, ultimately providing for a better quality of life).
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owners' rights but protect society-and the planet-as a whole.42 Rent
regulations burden the property owning landlords, but to the benefit of
social capital and community stability.43 The liberal view is much more
willing to accept individual regulatory burdens that improve the welfare of
the many and is much less sympathetic to any takings claims that might
arise in the process.44
Undoubtedly, the source of the disagreement is often animated by
different views about the value of the underlying regulatory intervention.
Conservatives are often skeptical that regulations actually produce their
putative benefit to the public.45 Sometimes this is because they dispute the
underlying goal. For example, conservatives and liberals may simply
disagree about the importance of environmental protection and the
regulation of carbon emissions. 46 But sometimes this is because
conservatives doubt the efficacy of the regulation.47 Disagreements are not
about the ends but the means. Conservatives-on this stylized account-put
faith in the markets and in voluntary transactions to improve everyone's
wellbeing.48 Property protection is therefore key to preserving individuals'
ability to decide how best to use their own assets. Liberals, in contrast, are
more willing to embrace direct regulatory interventions to address market
failures and to limit the power disparities that arise through the unequal
distribution of property.49
However, this traditional knee-jerk conservative opposition to property
regulations, and the corollary liberal one, now miss the mark as often as
not. In fact, the political valence of property protection in a number of

42. See Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of
Property Rights & Environmental Protection, I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 987, 995, 1001 (2005)
(discussing the effect of environmental regulation on property rights despite its contribution to
environmental protection).
43. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359-63 (1986).
44. Singer, Kormendy Lecture, supra note 7, at 614-15.
45. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73-74 (8th ed. 2011)

&

(arguing that compensation is necessary to force government to internalize costs of its actions, a view
that is inherently skeptical of regulations' benefits); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE
STATE 84-85 (1993) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, BARGAINING] (discussing skepticism ofregulatory benefits).
46. See John R.E. Bliese, Conservative Principlesand EnvironmentalPolicies, 7 KAN. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (1997) (discussing the wide variety of political opinions and philosophies in
recognizing and remedying environmental problems).
47. POSNER, supra note 45, at 75.
48. Ellen Byers, Corporations, Contracts, and the Misguiding Contradictionsof Conservatism,
34 SETON HALL L. REv. 921, 952-53 (2004).
49. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence ofEconomic Power in ConstitutionalTheory,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1508-10 (2016) (describing alternate views of government regulations to
remedy market failures).
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contexts no longer tracks these traditional conservative and liberal views.so
It is not automatically conservative and anti-redistributive to protect
property. In fact, protecting property in many cases is progressive,
redistributive, and actually promotes traditionally progressive values." In
this more complex landscape, people must be more attuned to the
underlying stakes of fights over property rights. Moreover, they cannot
simply rely on a strong assumption about the appropriateness of regulation
one way or the other.
II. THE NEW POLITICS OF PROPERTY

This shifting political valence of property and property protection
represents a kind of pragmatism or perhaps consequentialism. That is,
effects and consequences matter. Focusing myopically on conceptual
categories makes it easy to align with one camp or another. But attending to
the consequences of different rules requires confronting the messier role of
property in the real world. This results in more fluid attitudes toward
property protection.
For example, favoring regulatory power over property rights is
conventionally liberal.52 But, in fact, regulations are not always forces for
progressive redistribution." Instead, they are sometimes the product of
entrenched economic interests engaging in protectionism and burdening the
broader public to further their own economic interests.5 4 The politics of
property protection change considerably with increased attention to these
dynamics. In other cases, political changes reflect transformations in the
world-changes in the nature of the property being protected and the
individuals who benefit." Finally, some creative approaches to property
law have sought to use property protection for expressly redistributive

50. Singer, Kormendy Lecture, supra note 7, at 614-15, 628-29.
51. Id. at614.
52. See Treanor, supra note 22, at 782, 783, 818, 820-21, 825-26 (discussing conventional
liberalism in regards to property rights and societal regulations).
53. See Byers, supra note 48, at 958 ("[T]he law's protection of big business against the harsh
realities of pure competition has allowed greed and self-interest, along with a lack of accountability, to
flourish.").
54. Treanor, supra note 22, at 844.
55. See Edward D. McCutcheon, Note, Think Globally, (En)Act Locally: PromotingEffective
NationalEnvironmental RegulatoryInfrastructures in Developing Nations, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 396,
441-42 (1998) (describing an example of impacts of political changes on beneficiaries of property
protection).
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purposes.56 This is not all new." Some of these dynamics have been around
for years." Nevertheless, identifying these themes in a variety of areas
reveals a profound realignment in the politics of property. Consider these
changes in order.

The conventional politics of property protection relies on an implicitand sometimes explicit-assumption that government regulations burden
discrete private property owners to the benefit of the wider public." Indeed,
this concern is at the heart of the Takings Clause, which James Madison
viewed as important to protect what he expected to be decreasing numbers
of property owners against expropriations by the ascendant propertyless
working class.6 0 That concern carries through to contemporary scholarship.
In his seminal work on the Takings Clause, Frank Michelman assumed that
takings claims arise only in the context of regulations that generate more
benefit to the public than harm to individual property owners. 1 If that were
not true, he argued, the regulation would simply be impermissible and there
would be no need to inquire into the need for compensation. 62 For
Michelman, then, property protection under the Takings Clause
presupposes a welfare-enhancing redistribution. 63 This approach to the
Takings Clause provided the intellectual foundation for the Penn Central
test and is consistent with very limited bases for takings liability.'
Richard Epstein offered a contrasting, conservative account of takings
liability." He argued that compensation is necessary to ensure that a

56. See JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW:

STANDING GROUND 96, 99, 101-03 (2014) [hereinafter NOLON, LAND USE LAW] (discussing creative
approaches to land-use law for societal redistribution).
57. Id.
58. Singer, Just Obligations,supranote 3, at 331.
59. Singer, Kormendy Lecture, supranote 7, at 635.
60. Treanor, supranote 22, at 848-49 ("Ofthe three types of property identified by Madisonlanded, commercial, and manufacturing-he believed landed property was the type that in the long run
was most threatened by majoritarian rule. This belief stemmed from Madison's anticipation that this
country would experience enormous population growth.").
61. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (describing
utilitarian calculus).
62. Id. at 1195 ("The approving majority may gain less from the measure than the resistant
minority lose. In such a case, the imposition cannot appeal even to the weak justification that it
contributes a positive sum to the long-run social accounting.").
63. See id at 1168, 1182, 1195 (discussing social equality by welfare-enhancing
redistribution).
64. See Serkin, Existing Uses, supra note 28, at 1255 n.162 (describing the evolution of the
Penn Centraltest from Michelman's article).
65. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 45, at 85 (discussing the need for compensation to
ensure valid governmental takings).

Vermont Law Review

10

[Vol. 42:001

government action is welfare enhancing.66 In his view, compensation forces
the government to internalize the costs of its actions and thereby promotes
efficient regulatory incentives.6 7 Instead of assuming an efficient regulation
to begin the takings inquiry, Professor Epstein called for takings liability to
help ensure that regulations are actually efficient.
Liberals (and most courts) have rejected Professor Epstein's approach
for a variety of reasons. Among them is an abiding skepticism that forcing
the government to compensate will have a meaningful impact on regulatory
incentives.6 8 A greater faith in government comes with a presumption that
regulations are well meaning and welfare enhancing.6 9 Compensation is an
unnecessary check on regulations if government officials are already
presumed to be regulating in their constituents' best interests.7 0
The assumption that regulations are net beneficial seems increasingly
fanciful in some contexts. When regulations or other government actions
are the product of regulatory capture by entrenched economic interests, the
liberal justification for deference to regulations disappears." In that case,
property rights can serve as an important bulwark against regressive
expropriation. Property protection can be consistent with liberal goals in
ways that the traditional politics of property ignores.
This dynamic is on display in the sharp responses to Kelo v. City of
New London.72 In that case, the Supreme Court famously upheld New
London's exercise of eminent domain as part of an economic-development
plan that involved a new research and development facility for the Pfizer
Corporation." The Court ruled that the condemnation for economic
66. Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 45, at 73-74 (describing the government's sensitivity to
budgetary expenses); Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 576
(2012) (describing the conventional economic account of the Takings Clause).
67. See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 45, at 85 (describing just compensation as a
reasonable administrative cost to eschew "poor legislative schemes").
68. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An

Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 621 (1984) (explaining that because "fiscal illusion" plays
an important role in government actions, "[o]nly those costs ignored by the decisionmaker should be
compensated").
69.

Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of

Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 354-57 (2000) (arguing that governments should
internalize costs and benefits symmetrically, so if they do not need fiscal incentives to regulate for the
benefit of society, they should not need such incentives to avoid the costs).
70. More cynically, public choice theorists have questioned whether compensation will, in fact,
have any meaningful deterrent effect on inefficient government actions. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld,
supra note 68, at 620-22 (discussing the effect of budgetary outlays and fiscal illusion on determination
of compensation).
71. For a careful consideration of the literature on regulatory capture by economic elites, see
Sitaraman, supra note 49, at 1509 (discussing self-regulation of corporations).
72. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
73. Id at 473, 490.
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development was a permissible "public use" within the meaning of the
Takings Clause. 74 The Supreme Court granted certiorari following the
Michigan State Supreme Court's reversal of its seminal case, Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,5 which had been a high-water
mark of condemnation power. The Supreme Court used Kelo to reaffirm its
longstanding rule that the Public Use Clause in the Constitution is
extremely limited, even "coterminous" with a state's police powers.76
The Court's decision split on traditional political lines. The liberals on
the Court sided with the government.77 Their majority opinion reasoned that
New London had engaged in long-term planning to try to generate
economic redevelopment at the Pfizer site. Therefore, it was appropriate to
defer to the government's claim that the Pfizer project would provide a
substantial economic boost to the local economy." Implicitly, the Court
concluded that the individual property rights of the condeinees should not
stand in the way of a well-considered government plan to benefit the
community.7 9 Private rights generally must give way to valid exercises of
public power. In dissent, the conservatives on the Court concluded precisely
the opposite."o They reasoned that private ownership should have been
protected against what they viewed as governmental overreach." This is the
conventional division between liberals and conservatives when it comes to
property protection.82
The backlash to Kelo, however, was anything but predictable. Both
liberals and conservatives denounced the decision.8 1 Conservatives
complained about its anemic protection for private property. " On the other
hand, liberals expressed deep concern that New London's economicdevelopment plan involved expropriating property from middle-class
74. Id at 489.
75. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458-60 (Mich.
1981), overruledby County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
76. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) ("The 'public use' requirement
is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.").
77. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470, 483-85.
78. Id. at 483 ("The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it
believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including-but by no means limited tonew jobs and increased tax revenue.").
79. See id. at 483, 489 (pronouncing that a city is authorized to take private property for
economic development).
80. Id at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 496-97 (discussing the importance of property).
82. See Christopher Serkin, Response, Testing the Value of Eminent Domain, 89 TUL. L. REV.
115, 118 (2014) (discussing the political divide following Kelo).
83. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (discussing the liberal and conservative reactions to Kelo).
84. Id. at 2109-10 (cataloguing conservative responses).
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homeowners for the benefit of Pfizer." The underlying government action
looked to some like a product of regulatory capture by a large multinational
corporation, so liberals invoked property rights and the Takings Clause to
stop this regressive redistribution of wealth.86 Not all liberals agreed with
the characterization.8 7 Indeed, those (few of us) inclined to defend Kelo
generally did so by invoking the significant public benefits of the economic
redevelopment plan and-more abstractly-the relative institutional
competence of legislatures over courts in evaluating those benefits."
Nevertheless, the mainstream backlash crossed over political lines,
scrambling traditional attitudes toward property. In fact, the liberal concern
with New London's underlying action mirrored Justice Thomas's argument
that a city's poor and minority communities are the most likely to be
burdened by eminent domain.8 9
This political shift was at least partly the product of careful strategy by
the Institute for Justice and other conservative property-rights groups. 90
Understanding that private rights and governmental power are generally
zero-sum, they looked for cases that tip the balance toward property
protection. 91 Viewed as a narrow case about the meaning of "public use,"
the case generated nearly universal disapproval. 92 But viewed as a
strengthening of private property rights against government power, the
85. See, e.g., id. at 2107-09 (cataloguing liberal responses); see also Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Minority Interests, Majority Politics: A Comment on Richard Collins' "Telluride's Tale of Eminent
Domain, Home Rule, And Retroactivity," 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 1459, 1465 (2009) (distinguishing
subsequent case from Kelo because it did not involve "a politically vulnerable landowner, such as
Suzette Kelo, being forced from her lifelong home or business").
86. See Somin, supranote 83, at 2101-02, 2108 (summarizing the liberal responses).
87. Cf Christopher Serkin, Local PropertyLaw: Adjusting the Scale of PropertyProtection,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 895 (2007) (explaining that due to economic benefits, people may prefer
towns where local governments could condemn).
88. Id.("[T]hose local governments with the greatest power to engage in aggressive economic
redevelopment may fare the best in the Tiebout-style battle for residents and property values. While
living in such a town comes with some risks-risks that yours will be the property that ends up being
taken-it may also come with significant economic benefits."). Cf James E. Krier & Christopher
Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 859, 864 (discussing the high costs of judicial errors in
applying the Public Use Clause).
89. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[E]xtending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees
that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities.").
90. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 17, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/magazine/the-unregulated-offensive.html?_r-0
("Chip Mellor's
organization, the Institute for Justice, represented Kelo, whom the institute's lawyers had sought out
because she seemed like a sympathetic victim.").
91. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The Constitution and the Role of Government, 6
CHARLESTON L. REv. 449, 482 (2012) (describing efforts of the Institute for Justice and other
conservative organizations).
92. See Somin, supranote 83, at 2107, 2108-10 (highlighting the disapproval of Kelo).

2017]

The New Politics ofNew Property

13

stakes look both higher and more controversial. Nevertheless, the result is
that many liberals responding to Kelo agreed that the Takings Clause
should prohibit at least some condemnations for economic redevelopment.9 3
This is a real change in the traditional politics of private-property protection
and one based on an increased willingness to question whether a
government action generates real public benefits.
In other cases, changes in urban development have precipitated
changes in attitudes toward property protection.94 This is particularly true of
zoning and land-use controls. Throughout much of the twentieth century,
the stakes of zoning disputes were relatively clear. Pro-growth developers
sought to limit local land-use authority and argued for the protection of
their property rights reflected in the right to build.95 Liberals, on the other
hand, were generally more concerned about protecting in-place
communities from over-development; they sought to defend the use of
zoning and land-use controls to restrict development and minimize its
externalized harms.96 In their view, zoning was an appropriate restriction on
individual owners' property rights in order to preserve and promote the
community's overall wellbeing.9 7
But that basic divide-perhaps never completely accurate-has
become less stable. Liberals now increasingly recognize that overly
restrictive zoning decreases the supply of developable property and,
therefore, decreases affordability.9 ' Zoning, in many places today, is
associated with conservative not-in-my-backyard ("NIMBY") efforts to
thwart needed increases in density and housing stock. 99 Moreover,
sophisticated large-scale developers may actually embrace complex zoning
93. See id. at 2109 (cataloguing liberal responses).
94. David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1735, 1737 (2013).
95. See, e.g., id. at 1698 ("[P]olitical scientists like Harvey Molotch argue that big cities are
'growth machines,' dominated by a 'regime' of downtown builders and compliant political figures
seeking to expand the local tax base by allowing development to run wild.").
96. See, eg, Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REv. 739, 741 (1993) ("Minority
communities, which were often established as separate communities as the result of discriminatory
zoning and planning devices, are then frequently deprived of the land use protection basic to Euclidean
zoning principles.").
97. Singer, Kormendy Lecture, supranote 7, at 614-15.
98. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning's Steep Price, 25 REGULATION 24, 26
(2002) (finding evidence that suggests land-use restrictions are responsible for high housing costs in
New York City and California); Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion,
66 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 125, 129, 138 (2000); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Essay, Putting
Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and GeographicalScale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1667, 1682, 1685 (2013).
99. See Serkin & Wellington, supra note 98, at 1672-73, 1676 (identifying new forms of
exclusionary zoning).
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because they have a comparative advantage over smaller developers
seeking to navigate the regulatory landscape.100 In this view, zoning
complexity serves as a kind of barrier to entry and so amounts to
protectionism for large-scale developers.
New York City offers a powerful example of these new dynamics. The
populist and liberal Mayor de Blasio has focused on relaxing regulatory
restrictions, like minimum parking-space requirements and other limitations
on density."' This effort is explicitly designed to increase density and,
therefore, improve housing affordability.10 2 It marks a change from the
previous administration, which had loosened restrictions in the outer
boroughs, but tightened them in much of Manhattan.1 03 The result was to
protect property values in the more affluent areas and keep housing well out
of reach of many.
This kind of response to affordability is often not purely deregulatory.
In some instances, like in New York City, loosening zoning restrictions on
density is coupled with affirmative obligations on developers to provide
affordable housing or other changes that increase regulatory
interventions.1 04 It is therefore not the case that this new liberal attitude is
simply opposed to zoning. In other settings, too, liberals favor restrictive
zoning regulations primarily to precipitate bargaining moments that will
force developers to bear some of the externalized costs of new
development. 0 5 Nevertheless, reducing or restricting land-use controls has
increasingly become a new rallying cry for liberals concerned about zoning
protectionism and its adverse impact on affordability.
This relatively recent liberal focus on increasing density remains in
tension with a more traditional liberal attitude toward restrictive land-use
100. See C. Tsuriel Somerville, The IndustrialOrganizationof HousingSupply: Market Activity,
Land Supply, and the Size of Homebuilder Firms, 27 REAL EST. ECON. 669, 687 (1999) (finding data
consistent with the hypothesis that complex regulatory environments favor larger builders).
101. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Dep't of City Planning, Zoning for Quality and Affordability, N.Y.C.
PLANNING, http://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/zqa/zoning-for-quality-and-affordability.page
(describing the City Planning Department's approach to relaxing density restrictions) (last visited Nov.
26, 2017).
102. See id. (summarizing the goals of zoning changes, including housing affordability).
103. See Amy Armstrong et al., How Have Recent Rezonings Affected the City's Ability to
Grow?N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. 10 (2010), http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/RezoningsFurman_
CenterPolicy Brief March_2010.pdf ("[U]pzoned lots were located in areas with significantly lower
income than the City median . . . .").
104. N.Y.C. Dep't of City Planning, Inclusionary Housing Program, N.Y.C. PLANNING,
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/districts-tools/inclusionary-housing.page
(describing New
York City's inclusionary zoning regime) (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
105. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 5, 13, 17 (2010) (describing developer
and neighborhood roles in community benefits agreements).
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controls and, in particular, concerns about gentrification. Many on the left
still advocate for restrictive zoning in order to protect in-place
communities.106 In this view, new development is, in effect, parasitic on
existing social capital and amounts to a regressive redistribution from inplace residents to the developer.' 07 Zoning is justifiable in liberal terms as a
means of stopping or limiting that regressive transfer.' Similarly,
restrictive zoning in some places promotes environmental interests, which
also amounts to a transfer from the developer to society more broadly.' 09
But this is deeply dependent on context. Limiting growth in cities is almost
certainly bad for the environment insofar as it increases sprawl and carbon
emissions.' 10 Limiting growth in rural areas, however, can have the
opposite effect."' In other words, the reality is complex.
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the increasing liberal emphasis on
encouraging density joins forces with the traditionally conservative position
in opposition to restrictive zoning regulations, at least in places facing
significant development pressures. And property protection can be the legal
hook that helps to dismantle protectionist NIMBY zoning.112 Liberals, for
example, might find themselves supporting takings claims by developers of
lower-income, multi-family housing seeking to challenge an overly
restrictive land-use regulation.
The changing nature of some regulated property accounts for still other
changes in the politics of property. Property protection advances one set of
interests if the assets at issue belong to the poor and another if they belong
to wealthy corporations. The clearest example is perhaps regulatory

106. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stem, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in
Residential PropertyLaw, 99 VA. L. REV. 811, 828 (2013) (describing new zoning for social capital in
which "[c]omprehensive zoning plans describe the community 'stock' of social capital and report on
how to enhance social capital through zoning, support for community groups and organizations, and
growth controls").
107. Cf id at 833 (questioning "the necessity of abundant social capital" and discussing the undesirableness of redistribution in some cases).
108. Id at 846-49.
109. John R. Nolon, An Environmental Understanding of the Local Land Use System, 45
ENVTL. L. REP. 10215, 10219 (2015) ("Municipal zoning authority can be used to preserve open space
and protect natural resources. Zoning districts can be established specifically to protect environmentally
sensitive areas.").
110. Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and Effect,
35 U. DAYTON L. REv. 33, 55 (2009).
111. See generally NOLON, LAND USE LAW, supra note 56, at 97 (describing the relationship
between growth and the aesthetic character of rural areas).
112. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 459, 463-65 (2007) (describing
background on local regulations against affordable housing and recommending "a federal override of
local zoning laws" as one solution to address the problem).
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property, which has become a term of art that refers to property rights in
regulatory benefits.113
The concept of regulatory property has a long and important
intellectual history.114 The definitive treatment comes from Charles Reich's
path-breaking work, The New Property, in which he argued that welfare
benefits and other forms of public assistance should be treated as vested
property rights."' Courts, including the Supreme Court, at least partly
agreed.116 Recognizing these government entitlements as a form of property
meant that they could not be removed without due process of law."'
Expanding recognition of regulatory property was therefore a progressive
crusade."' Although the project was ultimately reined in by a conservative
Supreme Court,1 19 recognizing regulatory entitlements as property shifted
the political valence of property protection.
Regulatory property today is much more expansive than welfare
benefits, however, making the politics even more complicated. A recent
case in New York City demonstrates both the context in which regulatory
property is litigated and also the complex political stakes.
By far, the most important and influential regulatory-takings case is
Penn Central Transportation, Co. v. New York City.120 The case involved
New York City's landmarking of Grand Central Terminal. 121 Grand
Central's owners, the Penn Central Authority, sought permission from the

113. Steven J. Eagle, The Perils ofRegulatory Propertyin Land Use Regulation, 54 WASHBURN
L.J. 1, 1 (2014) ("Regulatory property refers specifically to governmental dispensations of special
privilege to individuals that are legally or functionally regarded as property, and are bestowed for the
articulated purpose of furthering the public good.").
114. Id. at 6-7 (describing the origin of regulatory property).
115. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 742, 785-86 (1964).
116. Id. at 773-74.
117. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-64 (1970) (noting that termination of welfare
benefits requires due process and "when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process"); see also Reich, supra note 115, at 785
(clarifying how government entitlements are seen as a form of property and cannot be taken away
without due process of the law; it is similar to the constitutional benefits seen in criminal proceedings);
Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154 (1958) ("Even
more important than the regulatory aspect of the welfare state is its office as the source of new rightsfor example, the expectations created by a comprehensive system of social insurance.").
118. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969) (arguing that wealth inequality
implicates constitutional principles).
119. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-45 (1976) (holding that an evidentiary
hearing is not required to comport with due process in termination of social security disability benefits
by distinguishing Mathews from the facts of Goldberg v. Kelly).
120. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
121. Id. at 115-16.
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Landmarks Commission to build a new office tower above the terminal. 122
The Commission denied the request, and Penn Central sued, alleging a
taking of its air rights.1 23 In upholding the landmarking and the decision of
the Landmarks Commission, the Supreme Court famously announced its ad
hoc three-factor test. The factors are: (1) the character of the regulation;
(2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct investmentbacked expectations; and (3) the resulting diminution in value.' 24 Applying
the last factor, the Court focused, in part, on the City's conveyance of
transferable development rights (TDRs) to Penn Central as part of the
landmarking.' 2 5 Those TDRs could be sold in a limited, pre-designated
receiving area to allow development that would otherwise exceed zoning
limits. In effect, by purchasing TDRs from Penn Central, a developer in the
narrowly defined receiving area could build a bigger and taller building
than would otherwise be allowed. As a result, the TDRs were quite
valuable.
In the ensuing decades, Penn Central managed to sell a significant
amount of its TDRs.1 26 However, as of 2006, Penn Central still owned
TDRs representing approximately 1.2 million square feet of development
potential.1 27 At that time, a consortium of investors, called Midtown TDR
Ventures, engaged in a sale-leaseback transaction of Grand Central,
primarily to purchase the TDRs.1 28 The investors were betting that the hot
Manhattan real estate market made some property in the receiving area ripe
for redevelopment. And they were right; just a few years later, developer
SL Green purchased property adjacent to Grand Central and proposed an
enormous new residential building called One Vanderbilt, named for its

122. Id.
123. Id. at 117, 130.
124. Id. at 124 ("The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action." (internal citation omitted)).
For a thorough discussion of each of the elements, see Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primerfor
the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 329 (2007) (describing each element of the Penn test).
125. Id at 137 ("[T]o the extent appellants have been denied the right to build above the
Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use of even those pre-existing
air rights. Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are made transferable to at least
eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal . . . .").
126. The facts recounted in this and the next paragraphs are discussed in detail in Christopher
Serkin, Essay, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 919 (2017) [hereinafter Serkin,
Take Two].
127. See id. at 919-20 ("[In 2009], Penn Central still owned approximately 1.2 million square
feet of unused TDRs from the original Grand Central landmarking.... This is an enormous amount of
development potential contained in the unused TDRs.").
128. Id. at 920.
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address on Vanderbilt Place. 129 In order to build up to the proposed height,
however, SL Green needed additional development rights. As a result,
Midtown TDR Ventures expected to sell nearly half of its newly acquired
TDRs to SL Green for approximately $475 million.130 The two parties
began negotiating the transaction." 1
Simultaneously, however, SL Green also allegedly entered into
discussions with New York City to rezone its property.132 In 2015, the City
agreed and granted a significant upzoning, effectively allowing SL Green to
build One Vanderbilt as of right after paying for certain infrastructure
improvements.133 The result was that SL Green no longer needed the Grand
Central TDRs. 134 Midtown TDR Ventures then sued, alleging that the
upzoning of the neighboring property was a regulatory taking of the
TDRs-the very same TDRs from the original landmarking in Penn
Central.'35 In the summer of 2016, the case settled on undisclosed terms, so
there will be no judicial resolution of the provocative takings claim. 13 6
Nevertheless, for present purposes, the fact of the litigation reveals a
changing political landscape.
This particular litigation over the Grand Central TDRs created unusual
political dynamics. Consider, first, the interests of preservationists.137 In
New York City, historic preservation efforts often rely on TDRs as a kind
of lubricant for historic designations.' Granting TDRs to landmarked
property will sometimes make property owners willing partners in
preservation efforts.1 39 And even if a landmarking is not entirely voluntary,
the creation of TDRs may at least forestall litigation by appeasing the
burdened property owner. Additionally, it will almost certainly prevent any
successful takings claim.' 40 Therefore, preservationists should worry about
government actions that undermine the value of TDRs. The City's upzoning
of SL Green's property reveals a previously hidden risk to TDRs; it might
129. Id.
130. Id. at 921.
131. See id. at 920-21 (noting Midtown Ventures' anticipation of sale and SL Green's
simultaneous consultation with New York City).
132. Id. at 920.
133. Id. at 920-21.
134. Id. at 921.
135. Complaint ¶¶ 11-12, Midtown TDR Ventures, LLC v. City of New York, 1:15-cv-07647
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015).
136. See Serkin, Take Two, supra note 126, at 914.
137. Id. T 3.
138.

See ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK 131-40 (2012) (discussing TDRs for

historic preservation in New York City).
139. See, e.g., id. at 215 (discussing examples of TDRs' successful contribution in preserving
landmarks in New York City).
140. Id. at 214-15.

2017]1

The New Politics ofNew Property

19

make property owners in the future wary of relying on them as a tool for
recouping the value of regulatory burdens. Preservationists, therefore,
might be sympathetic to Midtown TDR Ventures' regulatory-takings claim
in order to protect the value of TDRs. However, preservationists generally
object to expansive takings protection.141 Indeed, historic preservation is the
quintessential example of the traditional politics of regulatory takings, with
preservationists favoring the ability of government to impose some burden
on individual property owners for the benefit of the community. 142 In short,
there is a real tension between preservationists' desire to protect the value
of TDRs and their natural objection to takings liability.
Developers find themselves in precisely the opposite bind. For the
reasons discussed above, they traditionally favor an expansive view of
regulatory takings law. 143 They should naturally support an effort to protect
property interests-like TDRs-from regulatory interference. On the other
hand, developers also object to restrictive land-use regulations." They
generally support upzonings and municipal efforts to ease regulatory
burdens. 145
The politics of this litigation is complicated because protecting the
TDRs from regulatory change means preserving more restrictive
regulations instead of looser ones.146 Stepping back, the shifting nature of
regulatory property means that there are new politics surrounding the
protection of new property. Quintessential examples of regulatory property
today are not limited to the public assistance that Charles Reich discussed,
but instead include TDRs, radio spectrum, grazing permits, taxi medallions,
and so forth. 1 47 These forms of property have been around for a long time,
but issues around their constitutional protection are of more recent
vintage. 148 And expansively protecting these forms of regulatory property
generally means protecting large commercial or corporate interests and is

141. See, e.g., NOLON, LAND USE LAW, supra note 56, at 96-97 (discussing the TDRs' success
in restricting development to preserve historic landmarks). Cf J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings
Challenges to Historic PreservationLaws After Penn Central, 15 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 313, 330
(2004) (noting that regulators tend to find a middle ground in preserving historic resources and that
property owners have some means of protecting their property).
142. Serkin, Take Two, supra note 126, at 915,
143. See NOLON, Land Use Law, supra note 56, at 96-99, 102-03 (discussing developers' view
of favoring expansive takings).
144. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 94, at 1675 ("[Big cities allow relatively untrammeled
growth because of the political influence of developers.").
145. Serkin, Take Two, supra note 126, at 915.
146. Id. at 925, 927.
147. See Id. at 916 (identifying types of regulatory property).
148. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, ProblematicPrivate Property: The Case of New York
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. REG. 125, 140 (2013) (discussing taxi medallions as property).
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decidedly not redistributive. The TDR litigation described above pits wellfinanced investors against the government and its effort to allow greater
development density around Grand Central. 14 9 Recognizing protectable
property interests in regulatory entitlements does not necessarily serve the
progressive interests championed by Professor Reich in his seminal work.
The new politics of new property are fundamentally different and often
involve protecting entrenched economic interests.
Finally, property protection can sometimes be invoked for expressly
redistributive purposes. This is unquestionably the goal of communitarian
property theory, which seeks to incorporate redistributive commitmentswhat Greg Alexander calls a social-obligation norm-into the core
definition of property." 0 Protecting property looks very different if property
itself contains these social obligations."' But this is true of other theories,
too.
One example comes from the anthropological work of Peruvian
economist, Hernando de Soto.15 2 In two important books, he explored the
causes of poverty and political turmoil in Peru and in other developing
countries."' He argued that over-regulation and overly burdensome
regulation prevented large segments of the population from accessing
formal property regimes.' 5 4 As he detailed, overcoming the bureaucratic
hurdles to obtain a simple business license, for example, required a total of
1,800 hours."' The regulatory regime was so burdensome partly because it
was designed to protect entrenched interests and to exclude new entrants.' 56
As a result, most people seeking to enter the market were relegated to
informal property regimes, like becoming a street vendor instead of opening
a store.' 57 Street vendors do have something resembling property rights in

149. Serkin, Take Two, supra note 126, at 926, 931.
150. See Alexander, Social-Obligation,supra note 17, at 786 (stating that South African courts
could use "communitarian social-obligation norm to ameliorate the intolerable conditions that are the
lingering result of apartheid").
151. Alexander & Peflalver, supra note 17, at 64.
152. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 189 (June Abbott trans., 1989) [hereinafter DE
SOTO, PATH].
153. Id. at 189-92; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL
[hereinafter DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL].

154.
bureaucratic
155.
156.
157.

189-90 (2000)

See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 153, at 182-83 (describing extensive
procedures to access legal property systems in Egypt and Haiti).
Id. at 189.
DE SOTO, PATH, supra note 152, at 190-91, 194.
See Christopher Serkin, The Missing Rung: ChallengingRegulatory Barriersto Property

Acquisition, 6 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE J. 275 (2017) [hereinafter Serkin,

The Missing Rung] (describing the effects of regulatory and legal barriers).
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their locations, but they are privately enforced, by norms and by force, and
are therefore far less secure.'
Where the underlying regulatory regime is organized so profoundly in
the service of protecting entrenched economic interests, recognizing private
property rights can actually be redistributive. Hernando de Soto generally
called for loosening the barriers to the formal property regime as a means to
further economic equality.15 9 Indeed, in a previous essay, I tentatively
suggested that it might be possible to make out a takings claim to challenge
regulatory barriers to property acquisition.160 In other words, a vested
property right might not be a prerequisite to a regulatory-takings claim if it
challenges regulations that make it too difficult to acquire property in the
first place. Whatever the merits of the specific proposals, the important
observation here is simply that deregulation, and greater access to formal
property protection for informal rights, can actually promote the
conventional liberal goal of redistribution in this context.'
A second example comes from a recent article in which I argued that
governments can violate the Takings Clause by failing to act.162 The claim
is a controversial one because the Constitution is usually said to protect
only negative rights against the government; it does not create affirmative
obligations, except in very rare circumstances. 16 3 When it comes to the
Takings Clause in particular, people have long believed that legal change is
a necessary trigger for a takings violation. 164 The Takings Clause, in this
view, is designed to protect property owners from legal transitions so there
can be no takings claim in the absence of a change in the law. 165 However,

158. See generally DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 153, at 179 (discussing the
presence of street vendors and regulatory norms). Participants in informal property regimes have to
spend more of their time and resources protecting their assets, which also cannot be used as collateral
for loans. DE SOTO, PATH, supranote 152, at 195, 198-99, 236-37.
159. DE SoTo, PATH, supranote 152, at 256.
160. Serkin, The Missing Rung, supra note 157, at 275-76.
161. Some have labeled this liberaltarianism. See Brink Lindsey, Liberaltarians,NEW REPUBLIC
(Dec. 11, 2006), https://newrepublic.com/article/64443/liberaltarians (defining the term).
162. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to ProtectProperty, 113
MICH. L. REv. 345, 345 (2014) [hereinafter Serkin, Passive Takings].
163. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, The Abortion FundingConundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330, 330 (1985)
(discussing the government's obligation to refrain from infringing rights instead of an obligation to
affirmatively protect them); see DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989) (discussing rare exceptions).
164. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (2003)
("Regulatory takings claims are all about change. They are obviously about distribution of the costs of
regulatory transitions between landowners and society.").
165. See id. at 11-12, 24-25 (explaining the necessity of change to a takings claim and
"[diemands for compensation" as an attempt to "prevent legal transitions").
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in Passive Takings, I argued that this is not necessarily true, and that a
cognizable takings claim can arise when the law remains stable, but the
world has changed.' 66 I argued that there are situations in which the
government may be obligated to change the law to address ecological
change or else pay compensation.1 6 7 The animating example is sea-level
rise. I argued that, in certain regulatory contexts, like regulations governing
sea walls, it is nonsensical to distinguish between regulatory acts and
omissions.1 68
Specifically,
where
the government
has
acted
comprehensively in the past, such as when it disables self-help, the
government cannot then ignore subsequent threats to that property by
arguing it has not acted.
There is no space (nor need) to repeat the argument here. The point is
that expanding property protection to cover government inaction can
compel the government to act and regulate (or at least to re-regulate, where
existing regulations have become out of date). The argument, in other
words, is that property protection can become strong enough to compel the
government to act to protect it. Property can therefore be a constitutional
impetus for regulation, and not an impediment. This is a long way from the
libertarian concept of property which creates a sphere of autonomy safe
from government intervention.' 69 It turns the conventional politics of
property protection on its head. When property is protected enough, it
becomes a hook for compelling the government to intervene.
Across all of these different examples, then, the politics of property has
become more contingent and complex. As such, liberal and conservative
attitudes do not simply correspond to weaker or stronger property rights,
respectively.
M. MOVING FORWARD
What do these changes mean for property protection moving forward?
Most basically, they demand an end to the reflexive attitudes that have
dominated debates about property and takings law. It is simply not the case
that greater takings protection is always and inherently conservative, and
that deference to regulations is always and inherently liberal.' 70

166.

Serkin, Passive Takings, supra note 162, at 352.

167. Id. at 404.
168. Id. at 347.
169. Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L.
REv. 751, 754-55 (2009).
170. Serkin, Passive Takings, supra note 162, at 360.
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Some might object that the changes identified here are, in fact, all
conservative. That is, liberals should perhaps "toe the line" and support
even those regulations that appear to favor economic elites, for example, or
should object to expanding takings protection even for redistributive
purposes. There is no change in the political valence of property protection;
there is only capitulation to more conservative perspectives. It may be that
the very project of examining the underlying economic stakes of different
government actions starts to look uncomfortably like Lochnerizing, and is
inherently conservative."
This response, however, amounts to adopting a kind of irrebuttable
presumption: regulations increase overall wellbeing and property protection
does not. It is consistent with a fear that any willingness to extend property
protection is a slippery slope to Richard Epstein's libertarian view of the
Takings Clause. But this attitude reflects a kind of dogmatism that makes it
prohibitively difficult to do anything other than object to property rights.172
Politically, it risks alienating property owners and others with contrary
intuitions in particularly sympathetic contexts. Conceptually, this makes it
difficult to think critically about which regulations and government actions
actually deserve support. Such inflexibility is a real problem in modern
property law. So, recognizing the underlying interests in property protection
allows for more nuance and, ultimately, a more principled normative
approach to the Takings Clause.
Recognizing the shifting politics of property protection should make it
easier to move beyond dogmatism and toward a property discourse that
focuses on underlying values. This does not suggest any likely consensus
about what those underlying values might be. But it is important to continue
to focus on those values instead of on property, for its own sake, in order to
develop any kind of principled approach to property protection.
This does not suggest that liberals should necessarily support
expansive takings protection in any of the particular contexts described
above. Indeed, liberals may be appropriately wary of using the Takings
Clause as the doctrinal tool to achieve their goals. There is a risk that
expanding takings protection in one area may bleed into others and produce
uncomfortable results. Indeed, that slippery-slope argument may motivate
at least some liberal resistance to expanding takings protection. But it is
increasingly important to recognize the real stakes of some of these fights
because there are contexts, as I argued in Passive Takings, where expanding
171. See Id. (describing how the Takings Clause is inherently conservative).
172. For an argument that constitutionalizing issues, like property, can stifle political discussion,
see Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 701, 775
(2016).

24

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 42:001

takings protection can serve important liberal values. 17 3 In a world with
unstable and dramatically shifting politics, it has never been more important
to look beyond conventional attitudes and to focus on underlying goals.
CONCLUSION

The conventional politics of property has been entirely predictable.
Protecting property preserves the status quo and is inherently conservative.
There is a tautological sense in which that is, of course, true. But looking
beyond the protection of the status quo, for its own sake, to competing
attitudes toward redistribution reveals a more complex picture. In fact,
property protection can serve redistributive ends. Attention to these
underlying dynamics invites a more nuanced view of the politics of
property protection and the Takings Clause.

173. Id. at 361-62, 365, 368-70.

